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esidents of Chicago’s Streeterville neighborhood 
certainly cannot forget the recent financial crisis thanks 
to a gaping hole in their midst.
1
  That hole is to be the 
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 For a discussion of the global financial and credit crisis, see The Origins of the 
Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-
are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [hereinafter Financial Crisis: Crash Course]; 












home of the Spire, the tallest building in the Northern Hemisphere, 
at 2,000 feet high with 1,194 residences ranging in price from 
$750,000 for a studio to $40 million for the penthouse.
2
 
 The developer, Shelbourne Development Group, Inc., began 
construction in 2007 using its own funds.
3
  It also obtained “starter” 
funds from Bank of America via a loan agreement that required 
Shelbourne to demonstrate proof of a construction loan by 
November 1, 2008.
4
  Although Shelbourne sold thirty percent of the 
building, it could not obtain construction financing due to the 
worsening global financial and credit crisis.
5
  Bank of America 
declared the loan in default and sued Shelbourne for the outstanding 
principal, interest, and fees.
6
  As part of its defense, Shelbourne 
argued that the court should excuse it (temporarily) from providing 
proof of a construction loan, due to the “unforeseeable and 
unprecedented economic downturn and recession, particularly in the 
real estate market.”7 
 Historically, parties like Shelbourne had to perform their 
obligations absolutely and without excuse.
8
  This principle, known 
as pacta sunt servanda, was a mainstay in English contract law and 
                                                                                                                
SERIES PAPER 3 2008, at 10 (Initiative on Bus. and Pub. Policy at Brookings, Nov. 




 BofA Suing Spire Builder Says Shelbourne in Default on Loan, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 
14, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15844191; Robert Manor, 30% of Spire’s 
Condo’s are Sold, Mark Shows It Will Be Built, Developer Says, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10529156; New Details Emerge About Spire 
Project, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4787917. 
3
 Manor, supra note 2. 
4
 Complaint ¶ 6, Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 
2d 809, 826–28 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 09CV04963), 2009 WL 4695857. 
5
 Defendant Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc.’s Response to Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7, 
Bank of Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d, at 826–28 [hereinafter Response] 
6
 Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 8–10. 
7
 Response, supra note 5, at ¶ 33. 
8
 Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
225, 225 (1987); Aaron Wright, Comment, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral 
Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2187 
















Both English and American courts adhered strictly to this 
principle until the early seventeenth century when they began to 
excuse parties from a contract when performance became impossible 
due to death.
10
  Over the next two centuries, courts only marginally 
expanded the excuse to include any circumstance rendering 
performance truly impossible.
11
   
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (the “Commissioners”) recommended the adoption of the 
Uniform Sales Act (the “USA”) in 1906,12 the USA only provided 
for excuse due to absolute impossibility.
13
  However, contractual 
excuse made an about-face in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard
14
 in 
1916, when the court broadened the legal definition of impossibility 
to include not only those actions that a party literally could not 
perform, but also those actions that were impracticable for a party to 
                                                 
9
 Walter, supra note 8, at 225; see, e.g., Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238, 240–41 
(1819); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63, 66 (1809). 
10
 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 621 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 4th 
ed. 2004) (citing Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1629)); see Beebe v. 
Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Singleton v. Carroll, 6 J.J. March. 
527 (Ky. 1831). 
11
 E.g., The Harriman, 76 U.S. 161, 172 (1869); Beebe, 19 Wend. at 502.  Both 
The Harriman and Beebe noted the distinction between true impossibility and 
mere impracticability.  The Harriman, 76 U.S. at 172 (“If a condition be to do a 
thing which is impossible, as to go from London to Rome in three hours, it is void; 
but if it be to do a thing which is only improbable or absurd, or that a thing shall 
happen which is beyond the reach of human power, as that it will rain to-morrow, 
the contract will be upheld and enforced.”); Beebe, 19 Wend. at 502 (“[I]f the 
covenant be within the range of possibility, however absurd or improbable the idea 
of the execution of it may be, it will be upheld. . . . To bring the case within the 
rule of dispensation, it must appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means 
be accomplished; for, if it is only improbably, or out of the power of the obligor, it 
is not in law deemed impossible.”). 
12
 William E. McCurdy, Uniformity and a Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. 
REV. 572, 574 (1940). 
13
 Marianne M. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability – Does It Really Exist?, 2 
WHITTIER L. REV. 241, 245 (1980); Michael A. Schmitt & Bruce A. Wollschlager, 
Section 2-615 “Commercial Impracticability”: Making the Impracticable 
Practicable, 81 COM. L.J. 9, 9 (1976). 
14











perform due to an unreasonable and excessive cost.
15
  Thus, the 
excuse of commercial impracticability was born.
16
 
Although the relatively new excuse of commercial 
impracticability appeared in the Restatement (First) of Contracts in 
1932,
17
 courts seldom permitted excuse from a contract due to 
commercial impracticability.
18
  Much of this reluctance stemmed 
from the theory that courts should protect the sanctity of contracts, 
and avoid interfering with the agreement of the parties.
19
  
Additionally, courts believed a party’s ability to rely on the terms of 
a contract is important to economic stability, as a party would pause 
to enter into a contract if she knew the court could rescind it.
20
 
Hoping to make commercial impracticability more available, the 
Commissioners drafting Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(the “UCC”), to replace the USA, added the excuse of commercial 
impracticability to the 1943 draft.
21
  After the section underwent 
                                                 
15
 Id. at 460 (“A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not 
practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive 
and unreasonable cost.”) (citation omitted). 
16
 Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability: Searching for ‘The Wisdom of Solomon’, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1123, 1132–33 (1987). 
17
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932) (“[W]here, after the 
formation of a contract, facts that a promisor had no reason to anticipate, and for 
the occurrence of which he is not in contributory fault, render performance of the 
promise impossible, the duty of the promisor is discharged.”).  On first glance, 
section 457 only excuses a party due to impossibility, but section 454 defines 
impossibility to include impracticability.  Id. § 454 (“[I]mpossibility means not 
only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable 
difficult, expense, injury or loss.”). 
18
 William D. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 79 COM. L.J. 75, 77 (1974); John D. Wladis, Impracticability 
as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances Upon Contract 
Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503, 518–20 (1988); see 
Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 13, at 11. 
19
 H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. REV. 379, 405 (1991); 
George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial 
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial 
Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203, 218 (1979). 
20
 Classen, supra note 19, at 405. 
21
 Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L. 













minor changes during the drafting process, the section on 
commercial impracticability has remained the same since the 
promulgation of the UCC in 1950.
22
  Section 2-615 reads, in part:  
 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a 
greater obligation . . . 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or 
in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under 
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been 
made impracticable by the occurrence of a 
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic 




 When the American Law Institute updated the Restatement of 
Contracts in 1981,
24
 it included a revision of the section on 
commercial impracticability.
25
  Taking a cue from section 2-615(a), 
section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the 
“Restatement”) states: 
 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance 
is made impracticable without his fault by the 
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made, his duty to render that performance is 




                                                 
22
 Wladis, supra note 18, at 566. 
23
 U.C.C. § 2-615 (2013). 
24
 Publications Catalog: Restatement Second, Contracts, AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=29 (last 
visited Oct. 11 2013, 2:15 PM) (“Restatement Second, Contracts, constitutes a 
thorough revision and updating of the original 1932 Restatement. It embodies 
additions inspired by the Uniform Commercial Code and improves the black-letter 
formulations by altering the order or scope of topics to enhance clarity or reduce 
redundancy.”). 
25
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).   
26
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).  For a thorough 
discussion regarding the changes on commercial impracticability from the 












Regardless of whether section 2-615 or the common law applies, 
courts generally require some variation of the following elements: (1) 
an event occurred making performance impracticable; (2) the non-
occurrence of that event must have been a basic assumption on 
which the parties formed the contract; (3) the event was not caused 
by the party seeking excuse; and (4) the risk of the event occurring 
was not allocated to the party seeking excuse.
27
 
Despite the hope that section 2-615 and section 261 would lead 
to wide acceptance of commercial impracticability both under 
Article 2 and the common law, courts continue to rarely excuse a 
party under the doctrine of commercial impracticability.
28
  Even 
more rare, are judicial decisions discussing commercial 
impracticability in any meaningful way.
29
  The few cases that do 
discuss it developed muddled and inconsistent rules, leading to an 
unpredictable and confusing doctrine that fails to serve its intended 
purpose.   
Accordingly, this article comprehensively analyzes commercial 
impracticability, revealing its many faults.  It then provides a 
recommendation to simplify and unify the interpretation and 
application of the doctrine across contract law.  
Part I presents examples of commercial impracticability that 
demonstrate the current judicial interpretation and application across 
jurisdictions, which almost always disfavor excuse due to 
commercial impracticability. 
Part II presents the various faults associated with the current 
construction and application of commercial impracticability.  First, 
the vague and incongruent language of Article 2 and the 
Restatements results in inconsistent judicial decisions and, therefore, 
uncertainty surrounding the application of commercial 
impracticability.  Second, the generally accepted use of 
foreseeability as a key inquiry is unfounded, as neither Article 2 nor 
the Restatements require an event to be unforeseeable in order to 
                                                                                                                
Deborah L. Jacobs, Legal Realism or Legal Fiction? Impracticability Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 87 COM. L.J. 289 (1982).  
27
 E.g., Dell’s Maraschino Cherries Co. v. Shoreline Fruit Growers, Inc., 887 F. 
Supp. 2d 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Bank of Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 827. 
28
 Wallach, supra note 19, at 213. 
29












seek excuse under commercial impracticability.  Even if 
foreseeability were included in Article 2 or the Restatements, such 
inclusion would be improper.  The failure to allocate a foreseeable 
risk does not mean the parties meant to allocate that risk to the 
obligor; the parties may not have actually foreseen the foreseeable 
event or were unable to agree upon risk placement due to time, 
money, or disagreement.  Behavioral economics concepts such as 
bounded rationality, confirmation bias, and hindsight bias also 
demonstrate that the emphasis on foreseeability is misguided and 
unworkable.  Third, the narrow construct of commercial 
impracticability flouts the intent of the drafters of both Article 2 and 
the Restatements, who intended a liberal interpretation and 
application. 
 Part III presents and critiques previous recommendations for 
improvement to commercial impracticability, focusing on two of the 
most common: the superior risk bearer test and judicial loss 
allocation.  While these proposals arguably may improve 
commercial impracticability, they fail to address the root issues 
related to its construction and inconsistent application. 
Part IV recommends a complete revision of commercial 
impracticability, by providing suggested language and the 
justifications for the revision based on law, policy, and practice. 
I. IMPRACTICABILITY IN PRACTICE 
  Most commercial impracticability cases correlate to some 
significant national or international economic crisis, and almost 
always decline to permit excuse under commercial 
impracticability.
30
  The first set of decisions arose from the closure 
of the Suez Canal.
31
  Due to a conflict in the Middle East, the Suez 
Canal closed from November 2, 1956, to April 9, 1957.
32
  Shipping 
                                                 
30
 See Hawkland, supra note 18 at 79–80 (noting that, as of 1974, only five 
decisions relied on section 2-615). 
31
 Robert L. Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for 
Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 
HASTINGS L.J. 1393, 1400 (1969); Wallach, supra note 19, at 213. 
32
 Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1400.  In July 1956, the Egyptian government 
took control of the Suez Canal.  Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 











companies who entered into contracts prior to the closure 
encountered financial hardship as a result of the closure; changing 
their route from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope 
unexpectedly added thousands of miles and, thus, thousands of 
dollars to the cost.
33
  
 Many of these shipping companies sought excuse from their 
performance obligations under commercial impracticability.
34
  
Despite the added distance and expenditure, courts refused to excuse 
these shippers from their obligations.
35
  Because of the political 
climate in the Middle East, parties with business interests in the area 
knew the Suez Canal could be affected negatively.
36
  This 
foreseeability, along with the availability of alternative shipping 




The second round of substantial judicial discussion regarding 
commercial impracticability arose as a result of the oil crisis of the 
1970s.
38
  Due to a war in the Middle East, the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) imposed an embargo on 
                                                                                                                
shortly by Great Britain and France.  Id.  Egypt responded by closing the Suez 
Canal.  Id. 
33
 Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related 
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83, 103 
(1977).  By using the Suez Canal instead of the Cape of Good Hope, which is 
south of Africa, a ship may reduce its voyage anywhere from 3,315 miles to 9,887 
miles.  Saving in Time and Distance via the Suez Canal, SUEZ CANAL AUTH., 
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=11 (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:19 PM); see 
Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1401. 
34
 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 103–04; e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 
363 F.2d 312; Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).  
The closure of the Suez Canal also led to many cases in Great Britain seeking 
excuse under commercial impracticability.  E.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. 
v/o Sovfracht, 2 Q.B. 226 (1964); Societe Franco Tunisienne d’Armement v. 
Sidermar S.P.A., 2 Q.B. 278 (1960); see Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1400–02. 
35
 E.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Co. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 343 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972); Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 
F.2d at 320; Glidden, 275 F.2d at 257. 
36
 Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 318–19. 
37
 Am. Trading, 343 F. Supp. at 95–96. 
38
 See, e.g., Freidco of Wilmington Del., Ltd. v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F. 
Supp. 822, 824 (D. Del. 1981); Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Nev. ex rel. Dep’t of 












the exportation of crude oil to countries “sympathetic to Israel.”39  
After OPEC lifted the embargo, it increased the price of crude oil by 
400 percent over a four-month period.
40
  The embargo followed by 
the sharp inflation led to a shortage of oil, and exorbitant prices for 
what oil was available.
41
  Like the Suez Canal cases, courts found 
the oil crisis foreseeable due to the constant interference with the 
trade of oil, and refused to excuse parties affected by the shortage 
and high prices from their contractual obligations.
42
 
 The most recent set of decisions involving commercial 
impracticability stemmed from the recent global financial and credit 
crisis.
43ahr
  Like the developer of the Chicago Spire, individuals and 
organizations sought excuse from their contractual obligations due to 
commercial impracticability, arguing that the global financial and 
credit crisis prevented payment as required under their contracts.
44
  
Courts resoundingly rejected the defense because fluctuations in 
market conditions or the financial viability of a party are events 
expressly excluded by both sections 2-615 and 261.
45
 
                                                 
39
 E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433–34 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
40
 Id. at 434. 
41
 Richard W. Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2-
615, 32 BUS. LAW. 1089, 1093 (1977). 
42
 E.g., Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 634 P.2d at 1225; E. Air Lines, Inc., 415 F. 
Supp. at 440–42. 
43
 E.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871 
F. Supp. 2d 843, 856–58 (D. Minn. 2012); Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc. v. M.D.1, 
LLC, No. 11 C 2593, 2012 WL 5199634, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2012); Bank of 
Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 826–28; Twin Holdings of Del. LLC v. CW Capital, 
LLC, No. 005193/09, 26 Misc. 3d 1214(A), *5–6 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 19, 2010).  
For a discussion of the global financial and credit crisis, see Financial Crisis: 
Crash Course, supra note 1; Baily et al., supra note 1. 
44
 Supra note 25 
45
 E.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 858; 
Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc., 2012 WL 5199634 at *3; Bank of Am., N.A. v. 
Shelbourne Dev. Group, Inc., No. 09C4963, 2011 WL 829390, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 3, 2011); Twin Holdings of Del. LLC, 26 Misc. 3d at *5–6.  Both section 2-
615 and section 261 contain comments that expressly prohibit a commercial 
impracticability defense for market conditions.  U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (2013) 
(“Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is 
exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are 
intended to cover.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981) 











II. IMPRACTICABLE COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY 
Commercial impracticability arose out of the necessity for 
excuse from contractual obligations, in order to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the contract and to achieve fairness.  Despite 
these noble objectives, commercial impracticability developed into a 
narrowly applied, unpredictable doctrine based on vague and 
inconsistent language.  The requirement that the supervening event 
was unforeseeable is unfounded statutorily, theoretically, and 
practically.  Neither Article 2 nor the Restatement refers to 
foreseeability, and neither precludes excuse under commercial 
impracticability due to the foreseeability of the supervening event.  
Nevertheless, the inquiry into foreseeability is fraught with incorrect 
assumptions about how parties allocate risks, failing to account for 
the circumstances surrounding the contract formation and the effect 
of human psychology on risk assessment and allocation.  
A. Linguistic Impracticability 
The drafters of both Article 2 and the Restatement purposely 
omitted a definition of “impracticable,” leaving the task to the 
courts.
46
  Unfortunately, judges have defined “impracticable” with 
equally vague terms such as “commercial senselessness” 47  and 
“excessive and unreasonable cost,” 48  creating inconsistency and 
uncertainty as to what constitutes impracticability.
49
  Although 
                                                                                                                
the parties are ordinarily not such assumptions, so that mere market shifts or 
financial ability do not usually effect discharge.”). 
46
 U.C.C.§ 2-615 cmt. 2 (2013) (“The present section deliberately refrains from 
any effort at an exhaustive expression of contingencies.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. a (1981) (“But, like Uniform Commercial 
Code § 2-615(a), this Section states a principle broadly applicable to all types of 
impracticability.”); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial 
Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 343, 348 (1996); Steven Walt, Expectations, Loss Distribution and 
Commercial Impracticability, 24 IND. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (1990). 
47
 See, e.g., Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 457 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
48
 Classen, supra note 19, at 385; e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239, 277 (4th Cir. 1987); Asphalt Int’l, Inc. v. Enter. 
Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981); Natus Corp., 371 F.2d at 
456; Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 460. 
49
 Henry Chajet, Comment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of 












courts indicate that unprofitability or financial burden is insufficient 
for excuse,
50
 no quantitative standards exist to understand when 
unprofitability becomes impracticability.
51
  Anything less than 100 
percent cost increase appears almost conclusively insufficient,
52
 but, 
beyond that, courts vary wildly as to what is sufficient.
53
 
Additionally, the UCC version of commercial impracticability, 
section 2-615, only references the seller,
54
 thus, technically 
rendering commercial impracticability unavailable to buyers.
55
  
However, Comment 9 suggests that commercial impracticability 
may be available to buyers as well.
56
  The Commissioners purposely 
                                                                                                                
13, at 254; see Richard E. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: 
Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L. REV. 241, 267 (1980); 
Richard S. Wirtz, Revolting Developments, 91 OR. L. REV. 325, 348 (2012). 
50
 E.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th 
Cir. 1974); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 474 P.2d 529, 530 (Ore. 1970). 
51
 Gerald T. McLaughlin, Unconscionability and Impracticability: Reflections on 
Two U.C.C. Indeterminacy Principles, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 439, 450 
(1992); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 86; Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of 
Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 75 
(1990); Speidel, supra note 49, at 267.  Professor Dick Speidel argues that a 
quantitative inquiry for commercial impracticability is improper.  Id.  He suggests 
that courts instead should examine the extent to which performance differs from 
the agreed performance as well as the amount of undeserved gain, if any, the buyer 
receives without excuse. Id. at 266–68. 
52
 Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 
1972) (one-third cost increase insufficient); Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 
319 ($43,972 cost increase on contract of $304,843 insufficient); see, e.g., 
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73–76 (W.D. Pa. 1980) 
(finding $60 million loss sufficient); Iowa Elec. Light and Power v. Atlas Corp., 
467 F. Supp. 129, 140 (N.D. Iowa 1978) rev'd, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(finding 52% cost increase insufficient); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
53
 Wallach, supra note 19, at 217; Walt, supra note 46, at 67; see, e.g., Publicker 
Indus. Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. At 992 ($5.8 million loss over life of contract 
sufficient); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657, 667 (Neb. 
1950) (double costs insufficient). 
54
 U.C.C. § 2-615 (2013) (“Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater 
obligation…”). 
55
 Thomas Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World, 13 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 247, 257 (1981); see Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 109. 
56
 U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (2013); Black, supra note 55, at 257; Richard W. 
Duesenberg, Exiting from Bad Bargains via U.C.C. Section 2-615: An 
Impracticable Dream, 1 UCC L.J. 32, 34–35 (1980) [hereinafter Exiting from Bad 











drafted section 2-615 in this manner given the uncertainty of the 
common law at that time regarding a buyer’s ability to invoke 
commercial impracticability.
57
     
Regardless of the rationale, this linguistic conflict has led to a 
split among courts as to whether a buyer may claim commercial 
impracticability as an excuse to performance.
58
  Some courts only 
look to the language of section 2-615 to prevent a buyer’s excuse 
under commercial impracticability,
59
 while others read the section in 
conjunction with the Official Comments to allow a buyer to seek 
excuse under commercial impracticability.
60
 
The Mississippi legislature recognized this inconsistency and 
revised section 2-615 to expressly include buyers.
61
  Interestingly, 
the Permanent Editorial Board (the “PEB”) for the UCC criticized 
this revision.
62
  Without providing examples or even hypotheticals, 
the PEB quickly dismissed the addition, stating that including buyers 
in section 2-615 could result in “excuse in inappropriate cases.”63  
This concern is unfounded as it merely gives a buyer the opportunity 
to seek excuse under commercial impracticability; the buyer still 
must meet the requirements of section 2-615.
64
 
                                                 
57
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58
 See, e.g., Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 884 (10th 
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L. REV. 137, 183–84 (1976); Nakazato, supra note 62, at 547. 
64
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The failure to define “impracticable,” and the conflict over 
whether a buyer is allowed excuse due to commercial 
impracticability, results in an inconsistent application of commercial 
impracticability.  Inconsistent application creates unpredictability, 
which often leads parties to spend additional time and money during 
the contracting phase to eliminate the unpredictability.
65
  Moreover, 
vague and incongruent provisions are in opposition to the stated 
objective of the UCC, which is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize 
the law governing commercial transactions.”66 
B. Unforeseen Impracticability 
A key judicial inquiry in the evaluation of commercial 
impracticability is whether the event was foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.
67
  The focus on foreseeability stems from the theory that 
a party would, or should, protect itself from a foreseeable event by 
adjusting the contract price or obtaining insurance to cover the risk 
of the event’s occurrence.68 
This fixation with foreseeability as the crux of commercial 
impracticability is unwarranted and inappropriate.  First, the 
foreseeability test is not derived from the language of section 2-615 
or Restatement section 261.
69
  Neither section expressly or implicitly 
requires, or even suggests, that the event be unforeseeable in order 
for a party to seek excuse under commercial impracticability.
70
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 Sykes, supra note 51, at 72–73. 
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 U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2013). 
67
 Rockland Indus., Inc. v. E+E (US) Inc., Manley-Regan Chems. Div., 991 F. 
Supp. 468, 472 (D. Md. 1998), reconsidered in part, 1 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D. Md. 
1998). 
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2-615 from the Common Law, 72 NW. U.  L. REV. 1032, 1038 (1978) [hereinafter 
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Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under U.C.C. Section 2-615, 











Indeed, the Comments to section 261 expressly reject foreseeability 
as a conclusive element of commercial impracticability.
71
 
Courts applying section 2-615 often point to Comment 1 of 
section 2-615 to justify the use of foreseeability,
72
 which states: 
“This section excuses a seller…where his performance had become 
commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening 
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
of contracting.” 73   However, a distinct difference exists between 
“unforeseen,” which is utilized in Comment 1 to section 2-615, and 
“unforeseeable,” which is utilized by courts.74   
Unforeseen means that the parties did not actually anticipate the 
event, while unforeseeable means the event was not capable of being 
anticipated.
75
  Comment 1 hints at this distinction by its language 
“not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contact.”76  
Using foreseeable and not foreseen significantly matters.  Rather 
than inquire into whether the parties actually anticipated the event, 
courts incorrectly look to whether the parties should have anticipated 
the event.
77
  Given the continuous economic fluctuations, political 
disruptions, and natural disasters of today’s world, most every event 
is foreseeable, but not necessarily foreseen, virtually eliminating the 
application of commercial impracticability.
78
 
The second flaw of the foreseeability test stems from the 
underlying rationale that contracts generally allocate foreseeable 
                                                 
71
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (“The fact that the event 
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 See, e.g., Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Constr. Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, 682 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). 
73
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74
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75
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77
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78
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risks of performance to the obligor;
79
 thus, if an event were 
foreseeable, the parties would have allocated the risk to the obligor.
80
  
Failure to allocate a foreseeable risk does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the parties would have allocated that risk to the 
obligor.
81
  The lack of risk allocation could be due to numerous facts, 
including that the parties did not foresee the foreseeable risk or the 




Behavioral economics also may explain why parties have not 
allocated a foreseeable risk.  A relatively young field of study, 
behavioral economics evaluates the effect of human psychology on 
economic theory “to improve the predictive power of…economics 




A fundamental theory within behavioral economics is bounded 
rationality.
85
  Developed by Nobel Prize winning psychologist and 
economist Herbert Simon, bounded rationality provides that 
individuals possess limited cognitive resources to process relevant 
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 E.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (“The purpose of a contract 
is to place the risk of performance upon the promisor.”). 
80
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567. 
82
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(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. c (1981) (“Factors such as the practical 
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83
 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
ITS APPLICATIONS 115, 116 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). 
84
 Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economcis, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998); Wright, supra note 8, at 2200–01, 2209.  For an 
explanation of the fundamentals of behavioral economics as well as some legal 
applications, see Jolls, supra note 83; Jolls et al., supra note 84. 
85











information and make decisions.
86
  These cognitive limitations result 
in various behavioral biases during the decision-making process, 
including confirmation bias, over-optimism, and hindsight bias.
87
  
These biases likely contribute to the failure to allocate a foreseeable 
risk by limiting parties’ ability to accurately assess the probability of 
a foreseeable risk occurring.
88
 
 Confirmation bias provides that an individual only seeks 
information that supports a favored result.
89
  People unwittingly seek 
evidence to support their position, or avoid evidence that counters 
their position.
90
  They avoid information and activities that do not 
support their choice.
91
  In the context of risk allocation, confirmation 
bias often prevents an individual from changing their initial risk 
assessment.
92
  Despite new evidence that informs a risk assessment, 
confirmation bias suggests individuals ignore that evidence, and, 
therefore, fail to protect themselves in the event the risk occurs.
93
 
 Over-optimism likewise hinders individuals’ risk assessment.ahr  
Even when a risk is foreseeable, individuals often are quixotically 
optimistic about the probability of a negative event affecting them.
94
  
Although they know the potential risks associated with the contract, 
individuals believe that the worst-case scenario will not happen to 
them, and thus fail to protect themselves within the contract or 
through other risk management techniques.
95
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68 LA. L. REV. 117, 132 (2007). 
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discussion on studies demonstrating this over-optimism, see Melvin Aron 
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211, 216–17 (1995). 
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The third issue with the foreseeability test also stems from 
behavioral economics.  Hindsight bias indicates that events seem 
more foreseeable ex post than ex ante.
96
  When individuals recall the 
past, their memory is inadvertently clouded with events and 
knowledge that occurred subsequent to that past.
97
  Because 
hindsight bias limits an individual’s ability to accurately recall what 
she knew at a particular moment, an inquiry into what was 
foreseeable at that moment may not produce accurate results.
98
   
In experiments conducted by noted psychologist Baruch 
Fischhoff, subjects consistently recalled giving higher probabilities 
to events that occurred than they did initially.
99
  Even more telling is 
that these subjects were unaware of this hindsight bias.
100
  
In the context of commercial impracticability, judges generally 
consider the event foreseeable first, and then seek evidence to prove 
otherwise.
101
  Because of hindsight bias, it is difficult to provide 
evidence that the event was not foreseeable.
102
  Consequently, 
hindsight bias hinders the application of commercial impracticability, 
by making every event seem foreseeable.
103
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The emphasis on foreseeability is arguably the biggest defect 
with commercial impracticability.  Regardless of its lack of a 
linguistic basis, foreseeability simply is not indicative of how parties 
allocate the risk of a supervening event.
104
  Even if it were indicative, 
hindsight bias limits the ability to accurately determine the 




C. Unintentional Impracticability 
Professor Karl Llewellyn, the lead drafter of UCC Article 2, 
intended Article 2 as a practical approach to commercial law.
106
  In 
the context of section 2-615, he utilized the term “commercial 
impracticability” rather than the traditional term of “impossibility” in 
order to broaden the application of excuse due to commercial 
impracticability.
107
   
This intent to broaden the availability of commercial 
impracticability is evident both in the language of section 2-615 and 
its Official Comments.
108
  For example, Comment 3 specifically 
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Duesenberg, supra note 40, at 1101.  Professor Llewellyn intended each UCC 
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contrasts commercial impracticability from impossibility and 
frustration of performance, while Comment 6 permits judges to “use 
equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good 
faith.”109  These excerpts suggest that the Commissioners viewed 
commercial impracticability more broadly than the common law.
110
 
Professor Llewellyn’s private notes confirm the intent to 
liberalize commercial impracticability.
111
  Discussing a proposed 
revision to the USA, which was inserted verbatim into a draft of 
Article 2, Professor Llewellyn notes the goal of the commercial 
impracticability provision was to broaden the current availability of 
commercial impracticability.
112
  Professor Llewellyn believed the 
widespread use of force majeure clauses in contracts demonstrated 
that most parties presume excuse when performance becomes 




The drafters of section 261 likewise anticipated a broader 
application of commercial impracticability under the Restatements.  
Not only is section 261 based largely on section 2-615, comment a 
expressly relays the intent to liberalize the application: “[L]ike 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a), this Section states a principle 
broadly applicable to all types of impracticability.”114 
Despite evidence to broaden commercial impracticability in both 
Article 2 and the Restatements, the current judicial interpretation and 
application of commercial impracticability contravenes the intent of 
the Commissioners.
115
  Courts continue to apply commercial 
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 and the few courts that attempt to 




III. IMPRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS 
A number of scholars have suggested alternatives to commercial 
impracticability, ranging from minor revisions to a complete 
overhaul.
118
  Although many of these recommendations arguably 
improve the current scheme, most only address specific concerns 
rather than improve the doctrine comprehensively or create new 
concerns.
119
  Two of the most referenced and analyzed 




A.  Superior Risk Bearer Test121 
A primary function of a contract is to allocate the inherent risks 
of the transaction among the parties.
122
  When the parties fail to 
allocate a particular risk, contract law provide default terms that do 
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note 16, at 1159–61; Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial Impracticability in Contract 
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  According to Professor Richard Posner and Andrew 
Rosenfield, these default terms should achieve economic efficiency 
(i.e. maximize the value of the transaction and reduce transaction 




In the context of commercial impracticability, Posner and 
Rosenfield argue that economic efficiency occurs when the risk of an 
event is allocated to the party with the lowest cost of appraising and 
either preventing or minimizing risks associated with a supervening 
event.
125
  In other words, the risk of a supervening event should fall 
upon the superior risk bearer.
126
 
To determine which party is the superior risk bearer, courts 
would examine who had (1) knowledge of the risk, (2) knowledge of 
the possible magnitude of the risk, (3) knowledge of the probability 
of the risk materializing, and (4) the ability and cost to minimize the 
risk or its loss through self-insurance, an insurance policy, or other 
diversification.
127
  Generally, the obligor is the superior risk bearer 
under these elements, because it usually is in the better position to 
understand the risks of performing under the contract, and, therefore, 
in the better position to prevent or minimize the risk.
128
  The obligee 
becomes the superior risk bearer only when the obligee could have 
insured against the risk at a lower cost.
129
 
Economics professor Christopher Bruce agrees with Posner and 
Rosenfield’s superior risk bearer test but offers a number of 
improvements.
130
  First, the evaluation of which party is the superior 
risk bearer should include an assessment of damage mitigation.
131
  In 
particular, the availability of discharge under commercial 
impracticability should depend upon each party’s attempt to mitigate 
damages and the results of those attempts.
132
  Second, Professor 
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 Bruce, supra note 118, at 311–12. 
131
 Id. at 315-17, 321–23. 
132











Bruce suggests a decreased emphasis on the ability of the more 
knowledgeable party to obtain insurance at a lower cost, because the 
more knowledgeable party often will circumvent this rule due to an 




Even with Professor Bruce’s refinements, the superior risk bearer 
test is inadequate to remedy the defects of commercial 
impracticability.  The fundamental assumption that parties allocate 
risks efficiently is incorrect.
134
  First, parties generally do not 
allocate risk to the party with the best information.
135
  Indeed, as 
Professor Bruce himself points out, the parties with better 
information possess greater bargaining power, which enables them 
to negotiate the risk away to the other party.
136
  This asymmetric 
information instead leads to inefficiencies due to increased 
negotiation costs and the obligor’s failure to insure. 137   Second, 
parties may not allocate risks efficiently due to industry customs, 
confirmation bias, over-optimism, or willingness to accept a loss in 




Moreover, the superior risk bearer test fails to examine whether 
the party who could have insured against the loss through self-
insurance, an insurance policy, or other diversification actually did 
so.
139
  That party may have assumed (incorrectly) that the other party 
was the cheaper insurer
140
 or had knowledge that the other party 
actually obtained insurance despite not being the more efficient 
insurer.  Furthermore, insurance, while not impossible to obtain, is 
often unworkable due to the difficulty to calculate statistically these 
uncommon, supervening events without sufficient actuarial data.
141
 
Irrespective of these fundamental defects, the application of the 
superior risk bearer test is unworkable.  Information and insurance 
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costs are often similar for both parties, making the determination of 
the cheaper insurer irresolvable, a defect which Posner and 
Rosenfield acknowledge.
142
  Other relevant factors such as the party 
best able to estimate the probability of the supervening event and the 
best party able to estimate the event’s resulting loss often result in 




Moreover, ascertaining which party was able to minimize the 
risk or insure against it creates an administrative nightmare.
144
  
Given the nature of the information necessary to determine the 
superior risk bearer, determining and collecting the relevant 




Furthermore, the superior risk bearer test suffers from hindsight 
bias much the same way as the current construct of commercial 
impracticability, because the court is examining who could have 
insured or minimized the risk more efficiently in hindsight and with 




B. Loss Allocation 
If a court holds that performance is commercially impracticable, 
then the remedy is to excuse the obligor from the performance 
required under the contract.
147
  Otherwise, the obligor must perform 
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and absorb the entire resulting loss.
148
  The consequence of this 
framework is that commercial impracticability is an all-or-nothing 
doctrine; either the obligor is fully liable or it is fully free of its 
obligations.
149
  Under the current construct of commercial 
impracticability, the obligor almost always absorbs the entire loss.
150
 
To alleviate this harsh effect of commercial impracticability, 
some scholars recommend that, rather than place the entire burden 
on just one party, both parties share the loss.
151
  In addition to 
creating a fairer result for all parties, this remedial scheme helps to 
preserve any long-term contractual relationship.
152
  Moreover, the 
possibility of judicial loss allocation may incentivize parties to settle 
out of court in order to achieve greater control over the allocation.
153
 
One approach to loss allocation is for the parties to split the loss 
equally.
154
  Professor Jeffrey Harrison supports this approach, citing 
both legal and moral foundation based on the view of a contract as a 
moral partnership.
155
  Because the parties in both contracts and 
partnerships create the relationship for their mutual benefit, 
Professor Harrison considers contracts as “quasi-partnership.” 156  
Accordingly, just as partners share losses equally absent agreement, 
the parties to a contract likewise should share losses equally absent 
agreement.
157
  Moreover, Professor Harrison argues that an equal 
split results in the fair and moral result as neither party agreed to 
bear the entire loss of an unexpected event.
158
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Because an equal split may result in just as unfair a division of 
loss as the current remedial scheme, many scholars instead suggest a 
proportionate, judicial loss allocation.
159
  To assist the judge in 
determining the allocation, the parties would present evidence such 
as the nature of the risk, the ability to mitigate the risk, the ability to 




Only one case utilized proportionate loss allocation upon a 
finding of commercial impracticability: Aluminum Co. of America vs. 
Essex Group, Inc.
161
  In ALCOA, the parties entered into a Molten 
Metal Agreement in which ALCOA would convert aluminum 
supplied by Essex into molten aluminum which Essex would then 
process into aluminum wire.
162
  The long-term agreement contained 
a price escalation clause based, in part, on the Wholesale Price Index 
– Industrial Commodities (“WPI”).163  Historically, the WPI closely 
mirrored ALCOA’s non-labor costs. 164   However, due to an oil 
embargo and pollution control measures, ALCOA’s electricity costs 
skyrocketed and substantially deviated from the WPI.
165
 
 ALCOA filed suit asking the court to modify the agreement due 
to commercial impracticability.
166
  Judge Teitlebaum held that 
ALCOA’s performance was commercially impracticable given that 
ALCOA would lose $60 million over the life of the contract and, 
although an unnecessary requirement, that the substantial deviation 
from the WPI was unforeseeable.
167
  Rather than excuse ALCOA 
from performance, Judge Teitlebaum chose to reform the agreement 
in order to “better preserve the purposes and expectations of the 
parties” and “avoid injustice in this case.”168 
 The parties agreed that, should the court find commercial 
impracticability applicable, the appropriate loss allocation was to 
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reform the contract to the ceiling price set forth in the agreement.
169
  
Nonetheless, Judge Teitlebaum created his own allocation to ensure 
that ALCOA would not receive a windfall as a result of the 
modification, which was the lesser of (i) the ceiling price set forth in 
the agreement, or (ii) the greater of the price calculated using the 
original escalation clause or the price which provides ALCOA a 
profit of one cent per pound.
170
 
 Although ALCOA’s proportionate loss allocation is supported by 
the comments to section 2-615, which allow courts to “use equitable 
principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith,”171 
it is an unrealistic remedial framework.  First, gathering the 
necessary information is administratively difficult and costly.
172
  The 
ALCOA trial, for example, lasted five weeks and comprised over 
2000 pages of testimony.
173
  With the overloaded and underfunded 
federal and state court system,
174
 the time and costs of a 
proportionate loss allocation are simply unworkable for the court 
system. 
 Second, because it relies heavily on each case’s facts and 
circumstances, a proportionate loss allocation would vary for each 
case, creating uncertainty in contracting.
175
  Certainty and finality 
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are important objectives of contract law given the role that contracts 
play in the global commercial environment.
176
  Also, uncertainty 
causes parties to spend more in transaction costs negotiating and 
drafting the agreement in order to help minimize that uncertainty.
177
  
 Finally, inherent in a loss allocation approach is that a judge is 
rewriting the contract for the parties whether or not they agree with 
the revised terms.
178
  American law recognizes that competent adults 
are free to contract with whom they choose, over which matters they 
choose, and under which terms they choose, provided such contract 
is not regarding an illegal subject matter.
179
  This freedom of 
contract is a fundamental principle in the United States.
180
  Only in 
extreme circumstances should the law interfere with the freedom to 
contract.
181
  These circumstances include individuals who are 
incompetent, individuals who did not voluntarily enter into the 
contract, and individuals who were induced to enter into the contract 
through fraudulent means.
182
  Accordingly, paternalistic doctrines of 
unconscionability, incapacity, coercion, and fraud are appropriate 
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limitations of the freedom to contract.
183
  But, when competent 
adults voluntarily enter into an agreement, the law should not 
interfere with its terms.
184
  A court cannot and should not force 
parties to accept terms or perform obligations created by a court and 




 Even if proportional loss allocation were feasible, it only 
addresses the remedial defects of commercial impracticability and 
not any of the multitude of underlying issues with its rules and 
application discussed throughout this article.  The form and 
substance of the commercial impracticability doctrine first needs to 
be revised before the result of such a finding is addressed. 
IV. PRACTICABLE COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY 
The following provision is one alternative way to restructure 
commercial impracticability to remedy its defects through 
straightforward language and the use of factors. 
 
In the event that performance under a 
contract becomes impracticable due to 
excessive and unreasonable difficulty, 
expense, injury, or loss, a court may excuse 
such performance to the extent necessary to 
prevent injustice.    
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In making this determination, the 
following factors are significant: 
a) The extent to which the event is 
outside of the control of the party 
seeking excuse;  
b) The extent to which the party seeking 
excuse has made reasonable efforts to 
minimize the difficulty, expense, 
injury, or loss; 
c) The extent to which the party seeking 
excuse would make a net profit or loss 
if performed as originally agreed upon 
under the contract; 
d) The existence of insurance, 
performance bond, guaranty, or other 
mechanism that compensates either 
party for all or part of the expense, 
injury, or loss; and 
e) Usage of trade, course of performance, 
or course of dealing. 
 
The provision begins by stating the basic rule for permitting 
excuse under commercial impracticability: a court may excuse a 
party in the interest of fairness if performance becomes excessively 
and unreasonably difficult, expensive, or leads to excessive and 
unreasonable loss or injury.
186
  While the fundamental concept of 
commercial impracticability remains unchanged, the provision uses 
more straightforward language to create clarity and, therefore, lead 
to consistent interpretation and application.  
In particular, it eliminates the “basic assumption” requirement in 
order to focus the analysis on the present rather than on the past 
intent of the parties.
187
  The provision also does not distinguish 
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between buyer and seller to ensure the availability of commercial 
impracticability to any party meeting its requirements.
188
  
Moreover, it provides a simple definition of commercial 
impracticability that sets parameters to quiet arguments that courts 
can discharge at will, yet broadens what constitutes commercial 
impracticability beyond excessive financial burden.
189
  Even though 
excessive expense is likely the most prevalent result of a 
supervening event, other detrimental results are possible, such as 
severe damage to business reputation, which could justify excuse 
from a contract under commercial impracticability.
190
  The definition 
accepts this possibility by including “difficulty, injury, or loss.” 
Most notably, the provision limits excuse under commercial 
impracticability to circumstances in which it is necessary to prevent 
injustice.  While stability and reliability of a contract undoubtedly 
are important considerations in commercial law,
191
 fairness and 
equity are also valuable considerations.
192
  Although some judges 
recognize that achieving fairness is an important objective,
193
 the 
current commercial impracticability provisions incorrectly assume 
that these considerations are mutually exclusive.
194
  The proposed 
provision expressly incorporates injustice into the analysis but 




Although the provision begins fairly broad, it then sets forth 
relevant factors that further guide judicial decisions to create a more 
homogenous, predictable application.  The use of factors certainly is 
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not novel in contract law; both Article 2 and the Restatements utilize 
factors in varying ways to provide some constraints to doctrines that 
require both stability and flexibility.
196
  
Each factor relates to either the extent to which excuse is 
necessary to prevent injustice or the inability to prevent or avoid the 
supervening event.  These factors derive from commonalities among 
judicial opinions.  The weight of each factor should vary by case, but 
by focusing the court on specific inquiries, commercial 
impracticability can develop into a more uniformly applied doctrine, 
which would lead to greater predictability. 
The first factor courts would examine under this revision is the 
extent to which the party seeking excuse could have prevented the 
occurrence of the supervening event.  This concept of “contributory 
fault” is found implicitly in the Official Comments to section 2-615 
and expressly in case law and speaks to the fairness of allowing 
excuse.
197
  A party cannot cause or contribute to the cause of the 
supervening event then expect excuse under commercial 
impracticability.
198
  To allow otherwise incentivizes the obligor to 
create or contribute to a supervening event in order to avoid its 
obligations.  
The second factor evaluates the extent to which the party seeking 
excuse attempted to mitigate the effects of the supervening event by 
utilizing alternative means of performance, provided that the 
contract does not prohibit those means.  Current case law 
unanimously supports this factor, because an alternative means of 
performance (or lack thereof) speaks to whether performance truly is 
impracticable.
199
  If a reasonable alternative exists, then the obligor’s 
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The third and fourth factors focus on the financial impact of the 
supervening event and the financial status of the obligor after that 
event.  Although the proposal expands circumstances of commercial 
impracticability beyond financial impracticability, the reality is that 
a majority of cases seek excuse due to the obligor’s excessive 
financial burden caused by a supervening event.
201
  Additionally, 
contract law remedies typically focus on granting money damages to 
either give the benefit of the bargain or to place the party in the same 
position she was in prior to contract formation.
202
 
Specifically, factor three requires courts to examine the 
transaction affected by the supervening event as a whole.  While the 
event may itself create a financial burden, the party seeking excuse 
may nonetheless make a net profit or only a small, manageable net 
loss.  In these circumstances, excuse due to commercial 
impracticability is neither necessary nor warranted.  The fourth 
factor focuses on the extent to which the party seeking excuse is 
made whole or close to whole under an insurance policy, self-
insurance, or other loss-mitigating mechanism. 
The last factor examines usage of trade, course of dealing, and 
course of performance to determine whether excuse due to 





 and course of performance
205
 are mainstays in contract 
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law, with numerous references in both Article 2 and the 
Restatements.
206
  The drafters of Article 2 specifically intended this 
emphasis on commercial custom and conduct in issues of contract 
formation, contract interpretation, and contractual liability in order to 
avoid rigid rules devoid of the parties’ actual intent.207  Arguably, 
the drafters of Article 2 intended to excuse performance under 
section 2-615 in accordance with commercial custom and practice.
208
 
By evaluating usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of 
performance in each commercial impracticability case, courts can 
reach a decision that reflects the commercial practices and customs 
in the parties’ industries.209  In doing so, courts can come nearer to a 
decision that more closely reflects what the parties would have 
agreed upon prior to the occurrence of the supervening event.
210
  
Indeed, some courts already look to usage of trade, course of dealing, 
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and course of performance under the current commercial 




The current construct of commercial impracticability is 
unnecessarily complex and focuses on irrelevant and inappropriate 
inquiries such as foreseeability of the event and whether 
“performance . . . has been made impracticable by the occurrence of 
a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption.”212  Given the number of articles critiquing commercial 
impracticability or offering alternative schemes,
213
 the doctrine 
clearly requires a comprehensive, straightforward revision that aligns 
with the reality of doing business in the modern, complex economy. 
The objective of this article was to propose alternative language 
that simplifies, clarifies, and modernizes commercial 
impracticability to achieve the UCC’s stated purpose and to create 
consistency and, thus, predictability.  The intent is not to broaden the 
availability of commercial impracticability, but to clarify when it is 
available and to whom through straightforward language and 
relevant inquiries.  The proposal maintains the fundamental 
principles intended by the drafters but not achieved through poor 
language choices and illogical and inconsistent judicial decisions. 
The mission, should the drafters of Article 2 and the 
Restatements choose to accept it, is to revise commercial 
impracticability utilizing clearer language and appropriate inquiries 
so that commercial impracticability can meet its mission to provide a 
fair excuse mechanism that reflects business practices in a consistent 
and predictable manner. 
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